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v

JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of Husband's cross-appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
BY CROSS-APPEAL
Two issues are presented for review by Husband's cross-appeal:
1.

Did the District Court Abuse its Discretion in Awarding to
Wife a Disproportionate Two-thirds Share of the Marital
Property?

The standard of appellate review of an award of marital property in divorce is
"clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion." See Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209,
1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Bradford v. DeMita, 1999 UT App 373, ] 12, 384 Utah
Adv. 26. This issue was preserved in the District Court by Respondent's Objections
to Supplemental Findings of Fact, Supplemental Decree of Divorce, Motion to
Amend and Request for Oral Argument filed January 29, 1999. R. 247, 249-250.
2.

Did the District Court Abuse its Discretion in Awarding
Alimony to Wife, in Light of the Court's Finding the She Is
Able to Meet Her Reasonable Financial Needs from Income
Generated by the Income-producing Marital Assets Awarded
to Her?

The standard of appellate review of a trial court's determination of alimony is
also "clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion." See Howell, 806 P.2d at 1211.
Bradford, 1999 UT App, ^[12. This issue was also preserved in the District Court by
Respondent's Objections to Supplemental Findings of Fact, Supplemental Decree of
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Divorce, Motion to Amend and Request for Oral Argument filed January 29, 1999.
R. 247-249.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY
OR REGULATORY PROVISIONS
The interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1996), as discussed in various
cases decided by this Court and by the Utah Supreme Court, is determinative of the
first issue raised by this cross-appeal. There are no other constitutional provisions,
statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations whose interpretation is determinative of any
issue in this cross-appeal or is of central importance to this cross-appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
The statement of these matters in the Brief of Appellant appears to be complete

and correct.
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Brief of Appellant fails, either in its Statement of Facts or in subsequent

argument, to identify and marshal many of the facts supporting the findings and
conclusions of the District Court on the issues on which she appeals. Husband
therefore supplements the Statement of Facts in the Brief of Appellant for the
purpose of rectifying its omissions and of providing the factual predicate for
Husband's own cross-appeal.
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Facts Relating to Award of Separate Property to Husband
I he I Hi iin, i i nun
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of law and worked on the ranch primarily on weekends, for which he received no
compensation. R. 323:35, 324:199-202. The statement in the Brief of Appellant at
p. 10 that "[Husband] spent as much time on the ranching operations as [his brothers]
did throughout the parties' marriage" is false and unsupported by the references to the
Record cited in the brief. See Brief of Appellant, p. 10, and citations in the brief to
R. 323:126,148, R. 324:199-202. The relevant evidence on this point, unrebutted but
not cited in the Brief of Appellant, is Husband's testimony that he averaged "at least
eleven, twelve hours a day" in the practice of law, and that "if I wasn't tied up in my
law practice, I typically tried to spend one day a week in the farming-ranching side."
R. 324:193-94.
The District Court found that Wife "went very infrequently to the [ranch]
properties and there was no evidence that she augmented, maintained or protected the
properties." Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ^f 14, R. 227.
It is untrue, and unsupported by Wife's references to the Record, that she "often"
accompanied Husband to the ranch properties or performed "maintenance duties"
while there. See Brief of Appellant, p. 9, and citations in the brief to R. 81, and
R. 323:119-120. Her actual testimony on the subject was that during the first year of
the marriage, 1970, she was on the ranch "quite a few weekends" or "whenever 1
could be" but that after their first child was bom, the summer following the marriage,
she was "stuck at home." R. 323:36, 119. In response to a question as to how much
time she had spent on the ranch over the entire 27-year course of the marriage, she
replied, "I have no idea." When given the opportunity to respond affirmatively to the
4
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or other value by Malpaso to T-N ('ompany In response to questioning by the Court

as to this note and others executed by T-N company, Wife's expert, Dean Smith,
testified as follows:
The Court: Well, that means these [payees of the notes] loaned their
money to T-N Company, and T-N . . . then owed the money back to them?
The Witness: That's true, but I don't think there was ever a cash
transaction. . . .
The Court: So these were notes carried on the books, for whatever
reason, and then were simply washed and forgotten?
The Witness: Correct.
R. 324:91-92. If actual funds or value were transferred, the Record contains no
evidence linking them to marital property. In any event, the $85,033 note was
ultimately cancelled. R. 324:51-52.
T-N Company Notes Given by T.N. Jensen to Wife. Another set of transactions
which Wife relies on to support her claim that marital property was used in the
ranching business relates to the assignment to her and subsequent cancellation of
certain notes of T-N Company originally payable to Husband's father, T.N. Jensen.
In connection with a tax-plan for distribution of his estate prior to his death, T.N.
Jensen assigned to Wife his interest in three promissory notes payable to him by T-N
Company in the amount of $10,000 each. R. 325:87-88; cf. R. 324:219-220.1
Following T.N. Jensen's death in 1992, these notes were cancelled. The related book
entries credited the value of the cancelled notes to the equity accounts of the T-N

•Documentary evidence of only one of these three gifts was offered at trial. See
Exhibit P-6.
6

Company partners equally. R. 324:51-52. Wife's testimony on direct examination
by her counsel was vague as to the number and amount of these notes. She displayed
no knowledge of the transaction by which the notes were canceled and credited to the
partners' equity, nor any knowledge of the purposeful context of that transaction.
R. 323:84.
A variety of other obligations of T-N Company were dealt with similarly upon
the death of T.N. Jensen. R. 324:51 -52,90-92. There is no evidence that he assigned
the T-N Company notes to Wife for any purpose other than that of facilitating the
maximum tax-free disposition, year by year, of his estate. The District Court appears
not to have considered and to have made no finding, nor is there record evidence to
suggest, that the assignment of the notes and their subsequent cancellation was ever
intended by T.N. Jensen or his heirs, or understood by Wife, to vest in her any
interest in T-N Company.
Proceeds ofSale ofZions Bank Stock Transferred to T-N Company. Wife also
relies in argument on a transaction by which $65,000 in proceeds of the sale of 861
Zions Bank shares nominally held in joint tenancy by Husband and Wife was
transferred to T-N Company. Her Statement of Facts fails to note, however, that
these shares were not derived in whole or in part from the 750 shares, acquired in
January 1988 during the course of the marriage, which were conceded by Husband
and found by the District Court to be marital property and divided equally. The 861
shares sold to provide funds for T-N Company, in contrast, had the same pre-marital
source as those which the Court awarded to Husband as his separate property.
7

R. 325:47-49, Exhibits D-20, D-21, Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law. ^ 1 7 , 19, R. 231.
T-N Ranches Partnership. T-N Ranches was owned equally by Husband, his
two brothers and his sister. R. 325:75. No interest in the T-N Ranches property was
ever held by any of the siblings' spouses, including Wife. R. 325:76. The properties
which made up T-N Ranches were acquired in 1962 by Husband's parents, T.N.
Jensen and Bonnie Jensen, and subsequently transferred directly to the Jensen
siblings or entities in which they held an interest. Exhibit D-39.
The interests of the siblings in T-N Ranches were initially disproportionate,
with Husband holding the largest share. In 1988 Wife joined Husband in executing
declarations of gift transferring portions of his interest in T-N Company to his
siblings. Exhibit P-12; R. 324:49-50. Husband testified that "[Wife] joined with me
in making a gift of my interest, trying to equalize my two brothers and my sister at
the request of my father." R. 325:85 (emphasis added). Following the death of T.N.
Jensen, his remaining interest was divided equally, which left the four siblings each
with a 25% interest in the T-N Ranches partnership.
Moynier Ranch Properties. The Moynier Ranch properties are held directly in
the names of Husband and his brothers. Exhibits D-27, D-28. The Moynier properties
were purchased from the Moynier family for $827,675, of which $633,437
represented credits for lands acquired by the three brothers from Husband's parents
and transferred to the Moynier family or sold and the proceeds used for the purchase.
The balance either had been paid by the brothers or was outstanding at the date of
8

trial. R. 323:142-144, 181-183, R. 325:56-61; Exhibits D-27, D-28, D-29, D-34.
Husband testified that none of the consideration provided in the acquisition of the
Moynier Ranch properties was derived from marital property. R. 325:59.
The Brief of Appellant asserts, without qualification, n[t]he $25,000 down
payment [for the Moynier properties] came from the parties' marital funds." See Brief
of Appellant, p. 12, citing R. 82, 224. But this contention is without support, either
in the cited pages or elsewhere in the Record.
Of the total purchase price of $827,675 for the Moynier Ranch properties, the
ultimate source of only $ 148,500 is unaccounted for in the Record. Husband testified
that the latter amount was paid by the Jensen brothers. R. 323:182; Exhibit D-29.
There is no documentary evidence or testimony linking Husband's share of the
$148,500 to marital funds in the amount of $25,000 or any other amount.
The only evidence as to the source of the Jensen siblings' payments on
Moynier, including those made by Husband, is that they were made, at least in part,
from "special" checking accounts set up for the siblings by their father and funded
from mineral royalties or the proceeds of sale of property originating with Husband's
parents. R. 323:75 and 183, R. 324:206-207. Each of the siblings had such an
account, in which their spouses had no interest. R. 324:208-210.
Ranching Operations Generally. Respecting the ranching business as a whole,
the testimony was undisputed that none of the siblings' spouses, including Wife, ever
held an interest of record, ever participated in the making of business decisions, ever
signed any document on behalf of the business, ever lent their credit to the business,
9

or ever otherwise participated in its operation. See, e.g., R. 324:207-212, R. 325:66,
68,70,73,76.
Zions Bank Shares. In addition to the ranching properties, Husband held shares
of Carbon-Emery Bank prior to the marriage which, subsequent to the merger of that
bank with Zions Bank in 1973, were converted into 2,126 shares of stock in Zions
Bank. R. 325:43, 48. At the time of trial these shares had, by virtue of stock splits
and dividend re-investments, less sales, grown to 58,352 shares. R. 325:44-45.
At Wife's request in 1985, Husband, who at that point held these Zions Bank
shares in his name only, caused all of the shares to be placed in the names of both
Husband and Wife in joint tenancy with rights of survivorship. The assertion at page
5 of the Brief of Appellant that Husband "conceded at trial that the stock certificates
gave Wife a present interest in the stock" is false. Husband's testimony on the
Record page cited in support of this claim is precisely to the contrary:
Q. At the time that these changes were made, Mr. Jensen, did you
intend to give Mrs. Jensen a present interest in the Zions Bank Stock?
A. No.
R. 324:216.
The testimony of both Husband and Wife as to why he placed the Zions Bank
shares in joint tenancy is consistent that he did so to satisfy Wife's desire that in the
event of his early death she have immediate access to the shares. Wife's testimony
on direct examination by her own counsel as to why she asked Husband to place the
stock in joint tenancy was, "I just feel like isn't that what this marriage is all about.
10

We're both working in the same direction for the same ends." R. 323:64. But under
cross-examination by counsel for Husband the following exchange occurred:
Q. Do you recall in that conversation your telling him why you wanted
him to do that?
A. Well, because I felt like we are working for everything together. At
that particular time 1 felt like it was very important, because he was gone a lot.
And I said to Jim, "If something ever happened to you, you know I - I
wouldn't want to have to deal with it." And he felt that - 1 mean, he reassured
me and said, "It's something that I should have been done anyway."
Q. Do you recall specifically saying to him, "I'm very concerned, with
all of your travel, that if something happens to you -"
A. Yes. I was concerned with everything because at one point we
didn't even have a will.
R. 323:128. Husband recalled perhaps five occasions over several months on which
Wife asked him to put the Zions Bank shares in joint tenancy. R. 324:213-214. He
testified regarding these conversations as follows:
Q. Tell the Court, if you would, please, in substance what was said by
her and what was said by you in the course of these discussions?
A. She indicated to me that the stock was all in my name, and she was
concerned if something happened to me, and that I was traveling, and away
from home a lot, what would happen. To my stock.
Q. What [did] you respond?

11

A. I told her that she that she knew that we had joint wills, that if
something happened to me provisions were made to take care of her and the
girls through the probate of my will.
Q. Okay. Did the discussion continue or the discussions continue to the
point that changes in fact were made on the names on the respective stock
certificates?
A. That's correct.
Q. Will you tell us, please, why those changes were made?

A. Well, 1 just got tired of the discussion with her, and put her name on
the shares of stock.
R. 324:214-216. The District Court, on this issue, found as follows:
This change [to joint tenancy] was made according to the testimony of the
parties at a time when the Defendant was engaged in significant business
travel, and the change was made to avoid probate in the event of his untimely
death. There was no evidence adduced at the trial of any donative intent with
respect to such exchange.
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ^ 18, R. 236.
2.

Facts Relating to Division of Marital Property
Marital Property. The Memorandum Decision of the District Court includes

a finding in the form of a schedule of distribution of marital property, consisting
principally of the family residence, automobiles and investments and retirement
accounts acquired during the course of the marriage. The Court valued the marital
estate at a total sum of $3,006,536.64, awarding to Wife an approximate two-thirds
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share valued at $2,004,736.16 and to Husband the one-third remainder, valued at
$1,001,800.48. R. 213-214.
The sole basis for awarding this disproportionate two-thirds of the marital
property to Wife, consisted of the District Court's finding that "certain assets should
not be divided equally between the parties even though they were acquired during the
course of the marriage and have been determined by the Court to constitute in part,
the martial [sic] estate." The Court's declared purpose in so doing was to "recognize
that . . . the Defendant has had the benefit of premarital assets that are now of
significant value." Supplemental Findings of Fact ^ 36, R. 236; see also, Id.,ffij14,
16; R. 227-229 (Monica Cove residence distributed to wife free of associated
mortgage obligation to compensate wife for Husband's absence on ranch business).
The Record contains no other finding in support of the disproportionate distribution
of marital property.
3.

Facts Relating to Award of Alimony to Wife
Included by the District Court in the two-thirds share of the marital property

awarded to Wife were income-producing assets capable of generating annual income
of $85,110.84 or $7,092.57 per month. The Court also noted that should she sell the
Monica Cove residence and move to a home of value comparable to that occupied by
Husband, the resulting difference of $200,000 "could earn an additional $15,000 per
year or $ 1,250 per month.,f Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
H 36, R. 326-327.
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Although the District Court noted that, at a total of more than $100,000 per
year or $8,300 per month, "the income potentially generated from the assets awarded
to [Wife] would be sufficient to meet her needs," the Court nevertheless ordered
Husband to pay alimony to Wife in the amount of $4,000 per month until Husband
reaches age 65, stating as its reason for so doing that "[Wife] should not be required
to live off of the yield from her assets when the [Husband] would not be required to
do so by reason of his separate earned income." Id. at ^ 37, R. 237.
The Court further found that Husband had annual gross income of $195,000
but made no finding as to his net income, nor did it make any finding as to Husband's
own needs. See id.
Expenses of Wife. At trial, Wife presented a schedule of anticipated expenses
totaling $8,572 per month, including $2,232 of residential mortgage expense and
$520 of high school tuition expense for daughter Jorja, an eighteen year-old who was
in her senior year at the time of trial. R. 323:59-60, Exhibit P-2. In the course of
cross-examination of Wife, counsel for Husband established that the tuition and other
school expense had been paid by Husband for the balance of the year (R. 323:107 and
114), and that other of the listed expenses were inflated. See generally, R. 323:108116. Following trial, but before entry of the Court's findings, Wife presented to the
Court an estimate of her "future need" of $7,652 per month. See Plaintiffs Post-Trial
Brief, p. 17, R. 124.
During the pendency of the divorce proceeding Husband paid to Wife agreed
temporary alimony in the amount of $6,000 per month, which included funds
14

sufficient to make the monthly mortgage payments of $2,207 on the Monica Cove
residence, to make a $700 per month payment on the Spring Glen home and to
provide for the needs of daughter Jorja, leaving a net amount used for living expenses
of $2,947 per month.2 R. 323:29-30, 100-101. Although she testified that she had
borrowed unspecified amounts from her brother, Wife conceded, in effect, that the
temporary alimony had been sufficient for her needs. Her testimony was:
Q. . . . Of the $6,000 you received and then we deducted
these [mortgage] payments, the balance of about $2,900 or $3,000
a month was what you used to support yourself and Jorja?
A. Yes. That was gone in the rest of the utilities bills and
gas bills.
Q. Okay. But you didn't have any funds for the support of
Jorja other than those amounts for the last 18 months, have you?
A. No.
R. 323:101-102.
The Record contains no other evidence bearing on Wife's need following the
divorce, and the Court made no finding as to wife's need.
Wife's Earning Capacity. Although wife did not work outside the home while
the children were small, from 1985-1990 she was employed in Husband's law office

2

The Spring Glen home was sold prior to the divorce, and the District Court
awarded the Monica Cove residence to Wife but required Husband to assume the
mortgage obligations. See Supplemental Findings of Fact ^ 37, R. 235-236.
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in a clerical capacity, performing word processing, filing and receptionist duties.
Husband testified that she was a 'Very good" employee. R. 324:195-197. Wife
testified that she is qualified for part- or full-time employment as a receptionist.
R. 323:55. No evidence was offered as to Wife's likely earnings were she to find
employment, and the District Court made no finding in that regard.
Income and Expenses of Husband. There was some disagreement as to
Husband's disposable annual income. His own calculation, based on actual 1997 data,
was $11,893 per month [or 12 x $11,893 = $142,716 annually]. R. 324:229-237,
R. 325:91; Exhibit D-7. Wife's expert, Dean Smith, calculated that Husband's "cash
flow," based on 1995 income and expense as shown in the parties' tax return, was
$181,525 for that year [or $181,525 + 12 = $15,127 per month]. R. 324:53-56;
Exhibit P-5. Husband's expenses, net of alimony and child support, were shown at
trial to be $10,852. R. 324:239-249, R. 325:91-92; Exhibit D-9.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
First Issue on Cross-Appeal. Utah standards for the exercise of equitable
discretion in divorce presume that marital property will be divided equally and
require the trial court to justify a departure from that presumption by a finding of
exceptional circumstances and needs. The District Court made no such finding in this
case. It is clearly possible that the Court was moved by a desire to compensate Wife
for the award to Husband of his substantial interest in the Jensen family ranching
business as his separate property. If so, that circumstance was improperly considered,
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since the distribution to a party of his separate property is required under Utah case
law to be determined independent of and prior to the division of marital property. It
is also possible that the Court wished to compensate Wife for Husband's failure to
spend two full weekend days with his family, rather than spending one or both of
them working on the ranch. But that fact, had the Court entered a finding identifying
it as the relevant consideration (which it did not), fails to meet the standards
established by Utah case law for the required "exceptional circumstances".
Second Issue on Cross-Appeal Under Utah law, alimony is in its essence
remedial, awarded for the purpose of closing the gap between need and earning
capacity. It is thus error to award alimony to one capable of meeting individual needs
from individual income. The District Court's award of alimony to Wife in the amount
of $4,000 per month cannot therefore be sustained in light of the clear and undisputed
evidence that marital property awarded to her included property capable of providing
her with an income of $100,000 per year against her maximum claimed need of only
$92,000 per year. Moreover, the Court failed to make the required findings as to the
respective needs of both Wife and Husband and as to his ability to pay. Under these
circumstances, the Court's alimony award represents a clear and prejudicial abuse of
discretion and must be reversed.
Reply to Appellant's First Issue. Wife asserts a claim to an equal share of
58,532 shares of Zions Bank stock which the Court awarded to Husband as his
separate property, finding them to be a gift from his parents antedating the marriage.
Wife contends that by placing the shares in joint tenancy at her request, husband
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effectively transferred to her a present interest in the shares, and that they thereby
became marital property. Neither the evidence nor the law supports her claim. Both
Husband and Wife testified that she asked for the shares to be placed in joint tenancy
at a time when Husband was engaged in frequent travel, so as to give her orderly and
immediate access to the shares in the event of his untimely death. The Record
provides no evidence of any other coherent purpose on the part of either spouse. The
case law cited by Wife is either inapposite on the facts, dealing with challenges to
joint tenancy brought by strangers to its creation, has been rejected by the Utah
courts, or stands for the contrary of the position she argues. Moreover, the Brief of
Appellant fails to marshal the facts in support of the challenged finding of the District
Court awarding the shares to Husband.
Reply to Appellant's Second Issue. Finally, Wife's claim to an inteR t in the
Jensen family ranching business rests on the argument that occasional social visits to
the ranch during which she prepared meals for friends, together with various paper
transactions supposed by her to involve commingling of marital assets with the
ranching business, transactions of which neither she nor her counsel appears to have
understood the underlying economic reality, somehow converted her Husband's
interest in the ranching business into marital property. There is no evidence that any
of these transactions involved marital property. The Malpaso loan transaction upon
which she relies certainly did not involve marital funds, as she claims, and probably
did not involve a transfer of funds of any kind, according to the testimony of her own
expert. Similarly, three $10,000 promissory notes gifted to her by Husband's father
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and subsequently canceled were clearly her separate property. Therefore, even if the
notes represented a transfer of actual funds, again, her expert thought not, they were
obviously not marital funds. Another transaction upon which she relies, the sale by
Husband of Zions Bank shares and the contribution of the $65,000 proceeds to the
ranching business, clearly involved a contribution of his separate property, not a
commingling of marital property as she claims. Nor is there any evidence that
Husband used marital funds to acquire any part of the Moynier ranch properties.
Moreover, Wife again fails to marshal the evidence in support of the challenged
finding that the ranch properties were the separate property of husband. And, in any
case, the evidence she cites for her claim falls far short of that "clear and convincing"
quantum necessary to justify this Court in setting aside the finding of the District
Court.
ARGUMENT
In disregard of the settled practice of Utah trial courts and the rules laid down
by Utah appellate courts for the orderly exercise of equitable discretion in divorce
proceedings, the District Court, in the absence of supporting findings, awarded Wife
a disproportionate two-thirds share of the marital estate. Also without necessary
supporting findings as to the parties' respective needs or Husband's ability to pay, the
Court awarded Wife alimony of $4,000 per month, contrary to its own determination
that receipts from income-producing property awarded to her, even with no earnings
imputed to her from employment, were sufficient to meet her needs.

19

Wife, not satisfied with these windfalls, would now have this Court compound
the error below by awarding to her significant property found by the District Court
to be the separate property of Husband. In seeking this further advantage, the Brief
of Appellant misrepresents the Record, omits to marshal the facts supporting the
challenged findings, resorts to exquisite technicalities, eschews the applicable law set
forth by the appellate courts of Utah (citing instead cases from other jurisdictions
clearly distinguishable on their facts), and ignores the clear weight of the evidence.
General Principles for Awarding Property and Alimony in Divorce. It is
perhaps well, before proceeding to the issue-specific arguments which follow, to
restate briefly the general principles laid down by the appellate courts of Utah for
resolving issues of property and alimony in divorce cases. Often, the cases take the
form of commentary on Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1 )3, which provides that "[w]hen
a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating
to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties

" Utah Code Ann. § 30-

3-5(1) (1999). This statutory language confers "broad discretion upon trial courts in
the division of property, regardless of its source or time of acquisition" to be
exercised in a manner which "best serves the needs of the parties and best permits
them to pursue their separate lives." Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 134-35 (Utah
1987) (citations omitted).

3

(various revisions, the most current being that of 1999)
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In its instructions to the trial court on remand, this Court in Burt v. Burt, 799
P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), prescribed a "systematic approach" for
exercising its discretion in awarding property and fixing alimony in divorce cases:
[T]he court shouldfirstproperly categorize the parties" property as part of the
marital estate or as the separate property of one or the other. Each party is
presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate property andfiftypercent
of the marital property. But rather than simply enter such a decree, the court
should then consider the existence of exceptional circumstances and, if any be
shown, proceed to effect an equitable distribution in light of those
circumstances and in conformity with our decision. That having been done,
the final step is to consider whether, following appropriate division of the
property, one party or the other is entitled to alimony.
Id , n.10; accord, Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Once the trial court has rendered its decision on the factual issues relating to
property division and alimony, an appellate court will uphold that division "unless a
clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated." Howell v. Howell, 806
P.2d 1209,1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Bradfordv. DeMita, 1999UT App.373,f 12,
384 Utah Adv. 26; cf. Thomas v. Thomas, 1999 UT App 239, ^ 12, 987 P.2d 603.
(trial court's discretion must be exercised within "appropriate" legal standards).
Moreover, the trial court abuses its discretion unless it enters specific and detailed
findings in support of its decision, which must be "sufficiently detailed and include
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on
each factual issue was reached." Hall, 858 P.2d at 1021 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993)
(citations omitted) (quotation marks in original).
An appellate court "is not entitled to substitute its judgment for that of the trial
court except in the extraordinary circumstance of a 'manifest injustice.'" Reese v.
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Reese, 1999 UT 75, % 10, 984 P.2d 987 (citations omitted) (quotation marks in
original). In reviewing a challenge to the trial court's findings of fact, appellate courts
give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses and do not set aside a challenged finding unless it is clearly erroneous. See
Schaumbergv. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah Ct App. 1994); Yelderman v.
Yelderman, 669 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1983) (holding the weight and credibility of
testimony and other evidence is a matter for the trier of fact).
This Court has stated the obligations of a party seeking review of a trial court's
findings of fact as follows:
To successfully challenge a trial court's findings of fact on appeal, [a]n
appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking
in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. . . . M[T]he
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap
of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the
appellant resists.
Johnson v. Higley, 977 P.2d 1209, on rehrg. opinion replaced by, 989 P.2d 61, 366
Utah Adv. 9, 379 Utah Adv. 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (citations omitted) (quotation
marks in original); Schaumberg, 87 P.2d at 603 (denying husband's appeal of
determination that business building was marital property where husband found not
to have marshaled evidence supporting challenged finding that marital funds were
used to maintain and improve the building).
Virtually every one of the foregoing principles is violated by Appellant in her
Brief.
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CROSS APPEAL POINT I.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
WIFE A DISPROPORTIONATE TWO-THIRDS
SHARE OF THE MARITAL ESTATE.
In its disproportionate award of marital property, the District Court disregarded
the orderly procedure mandated by this Court in Burt, which requires that property
be first classified as separate property or marital property and which then presumes
that the parties will be awarded the entirety of their separate property and one-half of
the marital property absent some showing of "exceptional circumstances". The
District Court made no finding of such exceptional circumstances, nor did it
otherwise identify equitable considerations adequate to support its lopsided
distribution of the marital property with its punitive impact on Husband.
Findings by the District Court. In its Supplemental Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, the District Court, after excluding Husband's partnership
interests in the ranching business and those shares of Zions Bank stock which it found
to be separate property of the Husband, determined that approximately $3 million in
asset value was appropriately classified as marital property. Of this amount, the
Court awarded $2 million in value to Wife and $1 million in value to Husband. See
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ^ 36, R. 236. The assets
which the Court determined to be marital property consisted principally of the
Monica Cove residence, Zions Bank shares acquired during the marriage with marital
funds, automobiles, various retirement and pension accounts and miscellaneous
personal property. The Court's distribution of these assets was essentially equal with
the exception of the Monica Cove residence, which the Court awarded wholly to
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wife, and the associated mortgage obligations, which the Court assigned solely to
Husband. See Memorandum Decision. 17-19. R. 212-214.4
The Court found, without further explanation or specific supporting findings,
that "it is fair, just and equitable for [Husband] to hold [Wife] harmless from" the
mortgage obligations on the Monica Cove residence. In a separate finding, the Court
then awarded the residence itself to Wife with no other finding or reason than the
conclusory statement, "pursuant to its general equitable powers . . . certain assets
should not be divided equally between the parties even though they [are marital
property]," coupled with the observation that "the Court recognizes that in so doing
[Husband] had the benefit of premarital assets that are now of significant value."
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ^| 36, R. 236. This finding
may in turn relate, though the connection is never made explicit, to the Court's earlier
finding that Husband "took weekend time away from the family to work on the
[ranch] properties" and that the allocation to Wife of "commingled" property (the
Monica Cove residence was acquired with the proceeds of sale of a pre-marital
business interest of Husband and was the only asset explicitly identified by the Court
as commingled) was therefore "equitable." Id. atfflf14, 16, R. 227-228.
Marshaled Facts Supporting Findings. The totality of the marshaled evidence
which might support the disproportionate distribution of marital property therefore
comes down to this:

4

Had the Court equally divided the equity in the Monica Cove residence, the
overall division of marital property would then have been approximately equal.
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(i)

Husband's weekend work on the ranch took time away from his
family, and

(ii)

Wife did not receive any interest in the ranch, which the Court
found to be Husband's separate property.

These two facts at most, and these alone, constitute the predicate for the feeble
conclusory finding that it was therefore equitable to compensate Wife by giving her
two-thirds of the $3 million marital property.
Argument. Utah law rebuttably presumes that marital property will be divided
equally. "Each party is presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate property
and fifty percent of the marital property." Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); accord, Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Utah Ct. App.
1993) (explaining once a court makes a finding that a specific item is marital
property, the law presumes that it will be shared equally between the parties unless
unusual circumstances, memorialized in adequate findings, require otherwise). In the
exercise of its "broad equitable powers," however, "[a] trial court may elect to
distribute marital property unequally when the circumstances and needs of the parties
dictate a departure from the general rule

" Bradford v. DeMita, 1999 UT App 373

f 12, 384 Utah Adv. 26 (citations omitted).
In Thomas, 1999 UT App., ffl| 23, 24 "[exceptional circumstances,
memorialized in commendably detailed findings, justified departure from the general
rule that each party is entitled to fifty percent of the marital property" where the trial
court found that sale of a marital home would have forced husband to move from the
area and lose his employment. See Thomas, %% 23 and 24. In contrast, no such

25

exceptional circumstances were found in two cases where the relevant facts are much
closer to those involved here. In Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843, 849 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994), no exceptional circumstances existed where both spouses had the ability
to support themselves; and the trial court's award of the predominant share of liquid
assets to Husband to permit him to discharge a debt was held to be error in the
absence of findings sufficient to establish a valid marital debt. And in Hall, this
Court found error in the trial court's unequal distribution of equity in the marital
home in the absence of any finding that the basis for the inequality was wife's lack
of work experience and need to care for two autistic children. 'The trial court made
no findings as to any exceptional circumstances which took this case out of the
presumptive rule of Burt" Hall, 858 P.2d at 1023. So it is here.
In this case, the District Court's conclusory finding that "pursuant to its general
equitable powers . . . certain assets should not be divided equally," even if tenuously
coupled with the award of the ranch properties to Husband and the finding that
Husband's work on the ranch required "weekend time away from the family", is
similarly inadequate to show exceptional "circumstances and needs" of Wife which
would "dictate a departure from the general rule" of equal distribution of marital
property. See Bradford, 1999 UT App 373 % 26, 384 Utah Adv. 26. It is unclear, and
the District Court made no attempt to explain, why Husband's weekend work on the
ranch could have created some persisting and current exceptional circumstance or
need of Wife which could be compensated for with an interest in the ranch properties.
What the Court did here is clearly violative of the foundational principle,
embodied in a long line of cases stretching from Burt and Hall to Bradford, that
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identification and award of the parties' separate properties must be independent of,
and must precede, the division of marital property. This Court cannot allow a trial
court to disregard that principle, in the absence of explicit findings of extraordinary
circumstance and need, without introducing ongoing doubt and uncertainty into our
jurisprudence. To do so would severely limit the ability of the bar to provide reliable
advice to clients contemplating divorce. And it would invite a flood of future appeals
based upon little more than the desire of a marginally disappointed spouse to obtain
at the hands of this Court the advantage he or she was denied at trial.
For the Court to justify the disproportionate division of the Jensen's marital
estate on the ground that it had already awarded to Husband separate property, to
which he was clearly entitled as a matter of law and that is "now of significant value"
is a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion and should be reversed.

See

Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ^ 36, R. 236
CROSS-APPEAL POINT II.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING WIFE
ALIMONY OF $4,000 PER MONTH.
Findings by the District Court. After concluding that Wife might expect to
realize as much as $100,000 annually, or $8,300 per month, from income-producing
property awarded to her, the District Court inexplicably then proceeded to award her
alimony of $4,000 per month. The Court did so without entering any findings as to
the ongoing needs of either Wife or Husband. Moreover, as to Husband's ability to
pay, the Court found only that Husband had been paying $6,000 per month of
temporary alimony, that Wife had been paying from that amount the mortgage
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obligations on the Monica Cove residence totaling approximately $2,200, that
Husband would now make the mortgage payments, and that Husband had "gross
income" of $190,000 per year or $16,250 per month. From these limited and
incomplete findings the Court concluded that Husband could pay alimony of $4,000
per month and that it was "fair, just and equitable" that he do so. See Supplemental
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,fflj36, 37, R. 236-237.
Marshalled Evidence in Support of Finding. The evidence which may be
marshaled in support of this conclusory finding consists of the following:
(i)

Although the Court made no determination in this regard, and
although Husband's counsel developed evidence suggesting
artificial inflation of the claimed expenses, the maximum amount
of monthly expense which Wife claimed to anticipate following
the divorce was $7,652 per month.5 See Plaintiffs Post-Trial
Brief, 17, R. 124.

(ii)

Although there was some disagreement as to Husband's
disposable annual income, the Court could have concluded from
a schedule created by Wife's expert, Dean Smith, that Husband's
"after tax cash flow", based on 1995 income and expense as
shown in the parties' tax return, was $181,525 for that year, or
$15,127 per month. The Court's actual finding of $190,000 may
have been based on Husband's $191,898 of "adjusted gross

5

It is unclear whether this amount includes income taxes payable by Wife; Exhibit
C to the Post-trial Brief, containing the detail, is missing from the Record.
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income" taken from the same schedule. R. 324:53-56; Exhibit
P-5.
(iii)

Husband's expenses, net of alimony and child support, were
shown at trial to be $10,852 per month. R. 324:239-249,
R. 325:91-92; Exhibit D-9.

(iv)

During the pendency of the divorce proceeding, Husband
voluntarily paid Wife temporary alimony of $6,000 per month,
from which Wife paid the mortgage obligations on the Monica
Cove and Spring Glen residences. The Spring Glen residence
was sold by Husband and Wife during the pendency of the
divorce proceedings, thereby relieving Wife from the $700 per
month payment required thereon,

(v)

The District Court stated as its reason for awarding alimony to Wife
that "[Wife] should not be required to live off of the yield from her
assets when the [Husband] would not be required to do so by reason of
his separate earned income." Id. at ^J 37, R. 237.

From these marshaled facts, and without taking into account either the wife's
earning capacity or amounts received from income-producing properties awarded to
her, it was possible for the Court to conclude that Husband had net income of $ 15,127
per month which was sufficient to pay both his expenses of $10,852 and alimony to
wife of $4,000 with a $275 margin to spare. The Court, however, entered no finding
to that effect.
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Argument. Husband recognizes and accepts the general principle, articulated
by this Court in Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), that
Trial courts have broad discretion in making alimony awards. Therefore, we
will not disturb a trial court's alimony award so long as the trial court
exercised its discretion within the appropriate legal standards and 'supported
its decision with adequate findings and conclusions . . ..'
Id. at 946. (citations omitted) (quotations marks in original). In this case, however,
the trial court neither applied "appropriate legal standards" nor did it support its
decision with the required findings.
The legal standards applicable to alimony begin with the principle that "[t]he
general purpose of alimony is to prevent the receiving spouse from becoming a public
charge and to maintain to the extent possible the standard of living enjoyed during the
marriage." Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 601 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
(citations omitted). Alimony is thus remedial, rather than punitive, in character.
This, in turn, requires that the trial court make specific findings as to "(1) the
financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving
spouse to support him or herself; and (3) the ability of the payor spouse to provide
support." Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citations
omitted) (matter quoted in original).
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "where the income from the assets
awarded to the plaintiff is sufficient to maintain her in the manner to which she is
accustomed without periodic payments from the defendant," an award of substantial
alimony is error. See Dubois v. Dubois, 504 P.2d 1380,1381 (Utah 1973). Similarly,
alimony was held not to be an appropriate means of adjusting a disparity between the
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income of the parties where the wife to whom it was awarded had "substantial
accumulated wealth and monthly income" which permitted her "a standard of living
comparable to what she enjoyed during the marriage." Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166,
1171 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
The facts developed in the Record of this matter fall into a similar pattern. The
Court found, and wife does not appear to dispute, that her receipts from the incomeproducing property awarded to her are sufficient without more to meet her needs.
She did not claim, and the Court made no finding, that such an amount would be
insufficient to maintain the standard of living to which she was accustomed. The
Court did not even consider her personal earning capacity, although the evidence was
that she had developed a useful level of office skills and was a "very good employee."
R. 324:195-197.
On these facts, it was supererogatory and a clear and prejudicial abuse of
discretion for the Court to award her alimony in any amount, certainly at the level of
$4,000 per month, a punitive imposition on Husband without any demonstration of
offsetting need on the part of Wife. The Court's stated reason for so doing, that
"[Wife] should not be required to live off of the yield from her assets when the
[Husband] would not be required to do so by reason of his separate earned income,"
is without foundation in relevant Utah case law and is at odds with the concept of
alimony as a remedial rather than a punitive device.
Moreover, even if the Record evidence were sufficient to support an award of
alimony in some amount to wife, the District Court failed to enter findings sufficient
to enable this Court to evaluate the appropriateness of the award. In determining
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alimony, Utah trial courts are required to consider and make specific findings
regarding the needs of both spouses and the ability of the paying spouse. See
Breinholt, 905 P.2d at 880. Of the three matters so required to be considered, the
District Court entered findings of any degree only with respect to the third, the ability
of the payor spouse to make the required payment, and that, mistakenly, a finding of
gross income rather than disposable net.
The award of alimony to wife was, therefore, clear and prejudicial error and
cannot stand.
REPLY TO APPELLANT'S POINT I.
WIFE IS NOT ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF OF THE ZIONS
BANK SHARES AWARDED TO HUSBAND AS HIS SEPARATE
PROPERTY.
Separate Property. The principles are well known which govern property
brought into a marriage by gift to, or inheritance by, one of the parties. "As a general
rule, equity requires that each party retain the separate property he or she brought into
the marriage." Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Stating the matter more fully, the Utah Supreme Court has said,
[TJrial courts making 'equitable' property division pursuant to section
30-3-5 should... generally award property acquired by one spouse by gift and
inheritance during the marriage (or property acquired in exchange thereof) to
that spouse, together with any appreciation in its value, unless (1) the other
spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement,
maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby acquiring an equitable
interest in it, or (2) the property has been consumed or its identity lost through
commingling or exchanges or where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of
an interest therein to the other spouse.
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted). In
accordance with these principles, the District Court determined that the 2,126 shares
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of Zions Bank stock which husband had brought with him into the marriage, and
which had thereafter, by virtue of stock splits and dividend re-investments, less sales,
grown to 58,352 shares, were the separate property of Husband.
Wife does not dispute that, on these facts alone, the 58,352 shares were
Husband's separate property. She contends, however, that Husband's subsequent
placing of the shares in joint tenancy at her request had the effect of conveying to her
a present interest, thereby rendering the shares marital property.
In support of this contention, the Brief of Appellant somewhat confusingly
argues that the creation of the joint tenancy operated to confer upon Wife a present
interest as a matter of law, subject to a "correctness11 standard of review, but then
proceeds to argue the factual issue of the parties' intent in creating the joint tenancy.
Without marshaling the evidence in favor of the trial court's finding that the shares
remained the separate property of Husband notwithstanding the conveyance into joint
tenancy, her brief then further confounds the analysis by failing to make critical
distinctions between cases where the joint tenancy is at issue as between the joint
tenants and those cases where the action is brought by a third party. A final source
of confusion is the use of precedent from other jurisdictions which has been
specifically rejected in Utah and citation of Utah cases for their dicta "sound-bites"
rather than for their holdings.
Facts. Before examining the case law, it is important to be clear as to the
Record facts, including the testimony of Wife which parallels that of Husband as to
the purpose of placing the shares in joint tenancy. In support of her claim that
Husband placed the 58,352 shares in joint tenancy with the intent of conveying a
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present interest, her brief emphasizes Wife's testimony that she asked Husband to
place the shares in joint tenancy because, "I just feel like isn't that what this marriage
is all about. We're both working in the same direction for the same ends." See Brief
of Appellant, p. 5, (citing R. 323:64). But the brief fails to quote her further testimony that she raised the issue with Husband because of her concerns about the fate
of the shares in the event of his untimely death. "At that particular time I felt like it
was very important, because he was gone a lot. And I said to Jim, 6[i]f something
ever happened to you, you know I - I wouldn't want to have to deal with it.'n
R. 323:128.
When that testimony is included, the testimony of both parlies as to the limited
purpose for which Husband placed the shares in joint tenancy is entirely consistent.
It was Husband's corroborating testimony that "[s]he indicated to me that the stock
was all in my name, and she was concerned if something happened to me, and that
I was traveling, and away from home a lot, what would happen. To my stock."
R. 324:214-216. The assertion in the Brief of Appellant that "Husband's only
evidence that no present interest was intended was his own self-serving statement
made years after the fact" is thus plainly false.
The Brief of Appellant not only omits to note the simple and compelling
consistency of the testimony of the two parties, but further obscures the facts by
imputing to Husband a desire to conceal from Wife his "secret" intention to convey
less than a present interest in the shares, a motive for which there is not a scrap of
evidence in the Record, and for which her brief cites none, and by indulging in an
irrelevant disquisition on the fiduciary duties owed between spouses. See Pierce v.
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This change [the placing of the shares in joint tenancy] was made according
to the testimony of the parties at a time when the Defendant was engaged in
significant business travel, and the change was made to avoid probate in the
event of his untimely death. There was no evidence adduced at the trial of any
donative intent with respect to such exchange.
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ^f 18, R. 230-231. That
finding is entitled to the deference owed by an appellate court to the trial court that
heard the witnesses, whose determination it will not set aside unless clearly
erroneous. See Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994);
Yelderman v. Yelderman, 669 P.2d 406 (Utah 1983).
The Brief of Appellant relies in part upon California and Arizona case law to
the effect that creation of joint tenancy confers a present interest as a matter of law
and that the intention of the parties is irrelevant. But those cases all derive from the
same California jurisprudence, a community property state, in particular the
California case of Kennedy v. McMurray, 169 Cal. 287, 146 P. 647 (Cal. 1915), and
its subsequent statutory incarnation, which was expressly rejected by the Utah
Supreme Court in Neill v. Royce, 120 P.2d 327, 329 (Utah 1941). Those foreign
cases may therefore be ignored.
More interesting are the Utah cases cited in the Brief of Appellant, though less
for the general and commonly accepted principle espoused, that joint tenancy creates
a rebuttable presumption of a present interest, than for what their facts tell us about
how that presumption may be overcome in the view of the Utah courts.
The earliest of these cases of interest, Neill v. Royce, the case which first
adumbrates the subsequently articulated Utah rule that creation of a joint tenancy
creates a rebuttable presumption, is inapposite on its facts: the challenge to the joint
tenancy was brought by an intervenor not a part}7 to the joint tenancy, after the death
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distinguishable on their facts. In re Estate ofAshton, 898 P.2d 824 (Utah Ct. App.
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on the deceased grantor's intent as expressed in his will rather than his intent at the
time of creating the joint tenancy. See id. at 826. Ashton does not, and could not,
address the sufficiency of evidence to overcome the burden of joint tenancy as
between the joint tenants themselves. See Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Kimball,
442 P.2d 472 (Utah 1968), also involved a claim asserted by a third party where one
of the joint tenants was dead, as did McCullough v. Wasserback, 518 P.2d 691 (Utah
1974).
Moreover, Appellant fails in her duty to apprise this Court of a more recent
case which significantly weakens the argument in favor of Wife, Jesperson v.
Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980). In that case the husband disputed the award
to wife of some $ 19,000 which represented the value of a mobile home which she had
brought into the marriage and subsequently placed in joint tenancy. In doing so, the
Court commented that, "[although the home was held in joint tenancy, that is not
conclusive that a gift has been made" and affirmed the trial court's finding that "there
was no intention by Plaintiff to create a one-half property interest in Defendant." Id.
at 328.
In short, the Brief of Appellant cites no Utah case which on its facts supports
the arguments advanced. And it misreads one of the two Utah cases which support
the finding of the District Court, Greener, and ignores the other, Jesperson.
Appellant's law on this issue is no better than Appellant's facts. The finding of the
District Court is supported by competent evidence in the Record, conforms to the
requirements of Utah law, and should be affirmed.
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REPI ,Y TO APPELLANT'S POINT II.
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fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports
the very findings [she] resists.'1 Johnson v. Higley, 1999 UT App. 278, f36. This she
has completely failed to do.
Wife makes a series of incomplete factual assertions in support of her claim to
an interest in the ranching business. For a full statement of the material facts relating
to these claims, however, see 'Tacts Relating to Award of Separate Property to
Husband," supra, pp. 2-10. A full review of those facts demonstrates the following:
Wife made no material contribution of time or effort to the ranching business.
There is no evidence to support the claim at page 9 of the Brief of Appellant that Wife
"often" accompanied Husband to the ranch or that she performed "maintenance
duties" while there. Her visits were as few as ten in number over a period of 27 years
and her only work identified in the Record was cooking meals for guests on what
appear to have been primarily social, rather than working, visits. Such is the entirety
of the evidence to support her claim of having devoted significant time and effort to
the ranching business.
Thus, by no stretch either of the imagination or of equitable indulgence can
Wife's claimed efforts on behalf of the ranching business be deemed sufficient to
meet her burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that the District
Court erred in finding that she "went very infrequently to the [ranch] properties and
there was no evidence that she augmented, maintained or protected the properties."
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, f 14, R. 227.
Neither the $85,000 T-N Company note to Malpaso nor three $10,000 notes
gifted to Wife by Husband's father involved any commingling of marital property in
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of this claim refers not to the evidentiary Record at all but to a page in Wife's PostTrial Brief. The page cited is undocumented and does not, in any case, support the
contention made in the Brief of Appellant for which it is cited. See Brief of
Appellant, p. 10, R. 118.
She also claims, long after the fact, that three $ 10,000 notes of T-N Company
payable to Husband's father, T.N. Jensen, gifted by him to Wife, and (like the
Malpaso note) subsequently canceled without any actual cash transaction, somehow
required that the District Court award her an interest in the ranching business.
Clearly, if the three notes had any real value at all (as distinguished from their value
to T.N. Jensen as a means of tax avoidance), they were Wife's separate property. The
appropriate time for her to assert her claim, if any, was when the notes were not paid
according to their terms but canceled and credited to the Jensen brothers equity
accounts. If she can find a way around the statute of limitations (the notes were
canceled in 1993), she can still bring that claim against T-N Company in a legal
proceeding to which it is a party. But she cannot claim that the cancellation of the
notes by T-N Company represented a commingling of marital property, because the
notes were hers and hers alone.
Thus, upon scrutiny, these note transactions reveal themselves as something
other than the characterization urged in the Brief of Appellant. Whatever the reality
of these transactions, there is no evidence of commingling of marital property with
the ranching business; and the fragmentary facts adduced by Wife for that purpose
fail the test of clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the District
Court's finding that "T.N. Company is comprised of inherited property and should
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cauuon, pernaps in an excess ot husbandly sentimentality — the Record is silent as
to his motive) added a signature line for his Wife on the declarations of gift by which
he transferred minor fractions of that interest to his siblings for the purpose of
equalizing those interests at the request of his father. The claim that to do so
somehow gave Wife an interest in the partnership is contrary to the very purpose of
the transaction.
Wife does not claim, as she does with respect to the Zions Bank stock, that
Husband ever gifted to her any interest in T-N Ranches. Had he intended to do so,
he undoubtedly would have used the same form of writing he used to convey such
interests to his siblings. Her evidence in this regard again falls far short of that
quantum of clear and convincing evidence requisite for this Court to set aside the
District Court's finding that "it is fair, just and equitable that [T-N Ranches and other]
such properties be found to be separate properties from the marital estate, including
any appreciated value therein." Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law. 114. R, 227,
No marital property orfunds were used by Husband to acquire Moynier Ranch
assets. Wife's final claim to an interest in the ranching business rests upon a fanciful
mixture of unrelated evidence and pure invention to suggest that somehow $25,000
of marital funds were used in the purchase of the Moynier Ranch properties from the
Moynier family. She asserts, without qualification, "The $25,000 down payment
came from the parties' marital funds." Brief of Appellant, p. 12. The claim is utterly
without support in the Record. The first of the two citations given in support of the
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CONCLUSION
The District Court, in dealing with a large and complex aggregate of properties
and associated transactions, made only two significant mistakes. The mistakes were
not, however, those Appellant urges on this Court. Certainly, there is more than
sufficient evidence to sustain the District Court's finding that the transfer into joint
tenancy of the Zions Bank shares did not operate to convey a present interest to Wife.
That was not what she asked for, and that was not what she got. There was clear and
convincing testimony from both parties from which the Court could conclude that the
purpose of the transaction was to provide for her orderly succession to the shares in
the event of Husband's death, not before.
Nor are the bits and pieces Wife tries to pull together to support her claim to
an interest in the Jensen family ranching properties, some of them apparently
concocted for the occasion, adequate to demonstrate a "clear and prejudicial abuse
of discretion" in the award exclusively to Husband of his interest in those separate
properties. Wife neither contributed significant effort to the ranching business, nor
is there any credible evidence that marital property was commingled with that
business.
The mistakes which the District Court did make appear to reflect a desire to
somehow compensate Wife for Husband's failure to devote two full days a week
exclusively to his family. To a trial judge who has seen many a marriage that has
disintegrated through inattention, that is understandable enough. But the good judge,
however laudable his intentions, broke the rules. Under the binding standards laid
down by this and the Utah Supreme Court for the exercise of his equitable discretion,

46

he could not award alimony in excess of W'i/fe's demonstrated needs, as to which he
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be granted.
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